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BOOK REVIEW
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE. By Bruce A. Ackerman. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1980. Pp. xii, 378.
$17.50.
Reviewed by James R. Murray.*
In SocialJustice in the Liberal State,I Bruce Ackerman attempts to
construct a liberal theory of justice, and of law, that has as its defin-
ing feature a method of dialogue. The book's jacket predicts that it is
"[c]ertain to become the most important work in political theory
since John Rawls' A Theory ofJustice . . . ." This claim is ambitious;
but then so is Ackerman's book, both in the breadth of its topics
(ranging from genetic manipulation and infanticide to a theory of
judicial review) and in its vision. I shall examine here some of the
more salient subjects of SocialJustice in the Liberal State, and perhaps'
thereby preview the more extensive criticisms of the book. that are
certain to emerge, if the jacket's prediction holds true, over the next
decade.
2
For Ackerman, all issues of social justice are to be resolved in a
liberal society by "neutral dialogue": a particular form of dialogue
that he explains in great detail. My underlying criticism of the book
is that of the many truths in it, few, if any, are necessarily related to
or inherently part of a process of dialogue. I do not argue that dia--
logue, in many contexts, is not an important device. It is, for exam-
* Associate, Covington & Burling,.Washington, D.C. Member of the Bars of New York
State and the District of Columbia. B.A. 1976, University of Montana; B.A. 1978, Oxford
University; B.C.L. 1979, Oxford University; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School. I thank
Thomas Huff and Laurence Tribe for criticisms of a draft of this essay.
1 B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). Analysis of Acker-
man's book is not yet extensive. For a unique discussion of the central doctrines of the book,
see Weale, Book Review: A Symposium on Recent Books in Moral Political, and Legal Philosophy, 65
MINN. L. REV. 685 (1981). Weale argues that Ackerman's work "draws liberalism closer to
neo-Marxist and phenomenological theory," noting similarities to the views of Habermas and
Merleau-Ponty. Id at 699. For a lengthier discussion attempting to place Ackerman in the
general framework of liberal theories, see Alexander, Liberalism As Neutral Dialogue: Man and
Manna i the Liberal State, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 816 (1981).
2 It is telling to note that within a year of the publication ofA Theog ofjustice, that work
was the subject of a book-length critical examination by a renowned philosopher. See B.
BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLE
DOCTRINES IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
(Barry's book was written in the summer of 1972.)
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ple, a necessary feature of meaningful due process. 3 For reasons set
forth below, however, I argue that dialogue, in Ackerman's sense,
cannot play a defining, guiding role in liberal theory.
Let us briefly consider Ackerman's story. Throughout one's life,
"there can be no escape from the struggle for power. Each of us must
control his body and the world around it" (p. 3). This is the reason
for Ackerman's primary goal: to construct an ideal procedure which
rational individuals, subscribing to its rules, may use to engage in
power plays in an institutionally acceptable manner. This basic
characterization is one refreshing and candid aspect of Ackerman's
work-the acknowledgment that power, in its many forms and con-
texts, constitutes the stuff of political theory. Although many theo-
ries recognize this implicitly (Locke, Rawls) 4 or explicitly (Hobbes,
Nozick),5 Ackerman is unique in framing all questions of political
and distributive justice in terms of a reaction to the phenomenon of
power. The resulting analysis captures at least why people are con-
cerned about justice, perhaps more realistically than does Professor
Rawls' postulation of a "sense of justice" on the part of rational
individuals.
6
Ackerman calls his method of dialogue "constrained conversa-
tion" -a "dialogic" method which is governed by three principles:
rationality, consistency and neutrality. The first principle, rational-
ity, requires simply that "[w]henever anybody questions the legiti-
macy of another's power, the power holder must respond not by
suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why
he is more entitled to the resource than the questioner is" (p. 3). The
second principle, consistency, requires that "[t]he reason advanced
by a power wielder on one occasion must not be inconsistent with the
reasons he advances to justify his other claims to power" (p. 7).
These two principles need little explication. They are assumed prem-
ises of almost any philosopher who at least pays lip-service to the role
of reason in political theory.7
The third principle, neutrality, is the core concept of the book.
3 See, e.g., Tribe, Struclural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
4 J. LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960); J. RAWLS, supra
note 2.
5 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (W.G.P. Smith ed. 1929); R. NOzIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974).
6 J. RAWLS, supra note 2, defined at 46, 312, 505.
7 There are alternative positions, of course. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book 1 (E.
Hamilton and H. Cairns eds. 1963) (Thrasymachus takes the position that social justice is
nothing but the will of the stronger).
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Under neutrality principles, in a liberal conversation, no reason
given for a certain power arrangement is a good reason if it requires
the power holder to assert: (1) that his conception of "the good" is
better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens; or, (2) that,
regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to
one or more of his fellow citizens.
With the three principles of neutral dialogue established, Acker-
man organizes the book into four parts. In the ideal "new world" of
the first part of the book, liberal dialogues are monitored by a "Lib-
eral Commander" who is blessed with a "perfect technology of jus-
tice" (meaning that the Commander has no trouble implementing
whatever decision is just). This Commander is also responsible for
insuring that all power conversations are consistent with the three
liberal dialogic principles. The dialogues that ensue8 yield a distribu-
tional right of all citizens of the liberal state to equal shares of the
ideal world's only resource: "manna." Ackerman never explicitly
translates "manna" into any particular good when he makes the
transition from the new world to the real world. If manna turns out
to be money, one has a truly egalitarian-looking distribution. If,
however, manna turns out to be something like "treatment as a
equal," then one might have a very different-looking system.9 Still,
Ackerman hopes that "subsequent conversational moves will define a
8 So that the reader may get a flavor of what Ackerman means by dialogue, one exam-
ple follows:
COMMANDER: Unless I hear anything more, I shall declare that everybody pres-
ent in this Hall should start off with an equal share of manna. Are there any objec-
tions? JEW: I object. I deny that this Nazi is a citizen of our liberal state. And
since he isn't a citizen, he isn't protected by Neutrality. And since he isn't pro-
tected, I think we all should say he's a perfect swine and deprive him of all his rights
to manna. COMMANDER: But why do you deny that he's a citizen? JEW: Be-
cause he fails the defensive test. COMMANDER: Well, then, Nazi. What do you
have to say to this? NAZI: The Jew is wrong. While I do indeed think I'm better
than he is, I need not make this strong statement to justify my claim to an equal
share of manna. Instead, I need simply say that I am at least as good as a Jew and
so am entitled to at least as much manna as he gets. This statement is certainly
consistent with my true beliefs and fulfills the conversational requirements imposed
upon citizens of the liberal state. I give you what is owing, though nothing more (p.
76).
9 For a lengthier analysis of this problem, see Alexander, supra note 1, at 821. Ulti-
mately, Alexander's criticism of Ackerman on this point is unsatisfactory because it depends
on an attempt to locate Ackerman's theory of liberalism on a spectrum of philosophical posi-
tions, from libertarianism on the "right" side of the spectrum to welfare state theory on the
"left" side. This common portrayal of liberalism as "in the middle" is not accurate. Liber-
alism, by its refusal to endorse any theory of the good, is unique-it should not be visualized
as in the middle of political possibilities, but as standing apart from traditional "orthodox"
political theories (e.g., Marx, Plato). See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MO-
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liberal conception of equality that is compatible with a social order
rich in diversity of talents, personal ideals, and forms of community"
(p. 18). This "distinctive" conception of equality Ackerman calls
"undominated equality" (as opposed to dominated equality?)1o and,
he claims, it too will be protected and served by the dialogic method.
In Part Two ("Justice Over Time"), Ackerman extends the dis-
cussion to incorporate intergenerational problems into his dialogic
theory of liberal legitimacy. And, in Parts Three ("From Ideal to
Reality") and Four ("First Principles") he makes the full transition
from ideal world to "reality." As the perfect technology of justice
evaporates, the problems and structure of social justice begin to look
familiar. Majority rule is the structural norm; a good part of his ar-
gument is devoted to outlining the limits of majority rule. There are,
in Ackerman's system, "process controls" (e.g., the "checks and bal-
ances" of our Federal system) as well as "output controls" (e.g., a Bill
of Rights) on what the majority can do. For Ackerman, the justifica-
tions for these norms are established through the dialogic method.
However, Ackerman does not seem initially to wander very far
from the core of many other liberal positions. His most important
principle is neutrality; and what constitutes neutrality for Ackerman
is the liberal government's refusal to endorse or treat any person or
life plan as morally superior to any other. Government must endorse
no theory of the good. In the game of constrained conversation, the
shorthand conversational move for this fact is: "I am at least as good
as you are"-the dialogic analogue of "stalemate." With the
problems Ackerman poses we begin to realize that the classic tension
in political philosophy between theory and practice is at work in
Ackerman's book as well. In liberal theory, it is an historical fact
that certain values (e.g., freedom, equality, general welfare) are just
part of the "practice" component of that dualism. Unless one advo-
cates radical reform to an orthodox political system (e.g., Marxist),
one is left largely with the task of reconciling a host of conflicting
important values. For this reason, the bottom-line problems and so-
RALITY 123 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978); Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 844, 864-65 (1982).
10 Ackerman defines "undominated equality" as the fulfillment by a social world of the
following conditions:
a. No citizen geneically dominates another. b. Each citizen receives a liberal education.
c. Each citizen begins adult life under conditions ofmaterialequality. d. Each citizen
can fteeoy exchange his initial endowments within a flexible transactional network. e.
Each citizen, at the moment of his death, can assert that he has fulfilled his obliga-
tions of liberaltnrteeship, passing on to the next generation a power structure no less
liberal than the one he himself enjoyed (p. 28).
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lutions of different liberal writers will often sound and be similar.
Ackerman's book proves no exception.
The Problems of Method
Any theory that relies heavily on an ideal method likely confuses
the model's justificatory power with the direct moral justifications for
the substantive values supposedly justified by, or derived from, the
model. For example, Thomas Nagel has shown that in Rawls' the-
ory, the contract (entered into in the "original position") as a model
for a theory of social justice depends on the presumption that it is fair
to require citizens to submit to institutions and procedures only if
they could have agreed in advance on the principles by which they
must be governed." More importantly, Nagel argues persuasively
that hypothetical contracts, and hypothetical choices generally, have
no justificatory powerper se. A hypothetical contract is simply not a
real contract, no matter how attractive the stipulated conditions sur-
rounding it. In the case of the original position, then, it is not the
phenomenon of agreement that justifies the principles of justice, but
rather the moral power of the values supposedly derived from the
original position. One must examine the values embedded in the
first principle of liberty, the maximin principle (the lexical ordering
of the two principles of justice) to see if they are just and good.
The point is accentuated (as Ackerman himself notes in his dis-
cussion of Rawls) (pp. 336-42) when the conditions of agreement are
restricted in the Rawlsian fashion-not that these restrictions are not
ultimately "good" restrictions, but they are controversial and hence
detract from the power of the model qua model. The original posi-
tion's moral bounds are determined by the substantive restrictions on
choice: mutual disinterest of the parties, knowledge that they have
some individual life plan, knowledge of the need and desirability of
more rather than fewer primary goods, and a "sense of justice." One
can, as Nagel notes, always reap the moral fruits of the original posi-
tion by simply observing these constraints on political argument.
These points apply equally to Ackerman's model of "con-
strained conversation." First, we must question the notion that dia-
logue, as such, provides any justificatory power for Ackerman's
thesis. The dialogue, in any case, is always in part a rhetorical de-
vice. Although used as a form of philosophical argument, dialogue
is, for the vast majority of philosophers, an inferior one (include Ack-
11 Nagel, Raw/s onJustice, 83 PHIL. REv. 220 (1973).
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erman, save Plato). Furthermore, in Ackerman's sense, "dialogue"
often does no real work; rather, the conversational constraints do the
work of the general argument. The neutrality condition emasculates
the real force and purpose of Platonic dialogue. Dialogue's potency
is depleted in much the same way that the phenomenon of agree-
ment in the original position is hampered by the veil of ignorance.
Consider how easy the argument in Book I of The Republic might
have been for Plato had he proceeded a la Ackerman:
SOCRATES: "So tell me, Thrasymachus, what is Justice?"
THRASYMACHUS: "Justice, Socrates, is nothing but the will of
the stronger." GREEK COMMANDER: "Thrasymachus, you
have violated a principle (pick one) of constrained conversation.
OK, Socrates, now you can have a 'dialogue' with Glaucon." SOC-
RATES: "Gee, thanks Commander."
I do not argue that the neutrality constraint is not "good." It
simply does nothing for Ackerman's argument to tell the tale in
terms of the necessity for dialogue (in either liberal philosophical
writing, or, as I argue below, in everyday liberal power plays). At
one point Ackerman declares: "For a liberal statesman, the most ba-
sic right of any citizen is to have his question of legitimacy answered
in a liberal conversation" (p. 308). Granted, a liberal makes the
moral claim that an individual has a right to live his life with no
unjustified interference from his government. To say that there is
also a fundamental right to converse liberally about it with the gov-
ernment adds nothing to that moral claim. Indeed, as Albert Weale
argued: "To write a book justifying conversation is odd. If conversa-
tion resolves political conflict, should not the rationale of this method
be established by conversation itself?' 2 If a citizen has a complaint
or if he is confused by an action of the government, or if he has cause
to articulate his special circumstance, then indeed he has a basic pro-
cedural right to have his question answered by someone and an-
swered in a meaningful way. But the basic right to dialogue
described by Ackerman, while important, is not "basic," because it is
contingent upon the nonfulfillment of some other substantive right. I
shall return to this point.
The Concept of Neutrality
Ackerman vehemently attacks contractarian argument, espe-
cially Rawls', by pointing out that it is too easy to manipulate the
12 Weale, supra note 1, at 685.
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characteristics of the chooser and of the choice set "to generate any
conclusion that suits one's fancy" (p. 340). He argues that if one
wanted to establish the right to a given amount of, say, peanut but-
ter, then all one need do is stipulate that the hypothetical chooser
would prefer peanut butter to everything else in the world, or that
the choice set only permits people to choose between peanut butter
and a painful death. Yet Ackerman's preoccupation with Rawls'
methodology is not particularly helpful. One can easily accept many
of the substantive parts of Rawls' book without accepting the
method. One can even endorse the method as a heuristic device to
aid in focusing the issues of social justice. The true power of A Theogy
ofJustice is in the substantive arguments Rawls gives for equality and
autonomy. Ackerman's "peanut butter or death" scenario assumes
that others are as hesitant about calling a value a value (freedom-
yes, peanut butter-no) as he is.
It is remarkable that Ackerman does not admit that the con-
straints of neutrality do some powerful non-neutral work for him.
Surely the dialogic move "I am as good as you are" is not neutral in a
strict sense. It is a moral claim. Obviously, there is a special sense in
which everyone is as good as everyone else. The root premise of this
special sense is something akin to the idea of "basic human worth" as
outlined by Gregory Vlastos13 some years ago. For Vlastos this
value, that a person has worth as a person, can be sharply distin-
guished from all of that person's meritorious attributes. It is a con-
ception that is at the bottom of any theory based on "equal concern
and respect" or non-domination. That one's simply being a person
(described by Kant as just having moral agency or autonomy), irre-
spective of all other questions of merit or status, demands equal con-
cern and respect by one's government is: (1) liberal, (2)
controversial, and (3) concerned with a particular conception' 4 of
moral equality (and not neutrality).
Thus, the dialogic move "I am as good as you are" does not
express moral relativity. Some people may still have better values
than others. Ackerman often fudges the two claims. Perhaps the
13 Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
14 I follow Professor Dworkin's distinction between a concept and a conception. A con-
ception is more detailed and is peculiarly normative: "When I appeal to the concept of fair-
ness I appeal to what fairness means, and I give my views on that issue no special standing.
When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by fairness, and my view is
therefore the heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral issue; when I lay




most dramatic example of this tendency is his discussion of liberal
education.
Ackerman's analysis of liberal education is both a virtue and a
vice of his theory. It represents an admirable attempt to flesh out
broader the liberal vision's cultural and educational consequences.
Yet for many, including myself, it exemplifies dramatically the most
bankrupt aspect of a full-blown theory of neutrality.
For Ackerman, dialogue leads to the conclusion that the liberal
state must provide its youth with the intellectual necessities, .e., an
educational basis, for the ultimate choice of values and self-defini-
tion. At the higher levels of instruction, this would require "free
choice" of curriculum and an abhorrence of "core-requirements."
On all levels of instruction, the system must resist merely an exten-
sion of the child's "primary culture." Rather, it must "provide the
child with access to the wide range of cultural materials that he may
find useful in developing his own moral ideals and patterns of life"
(p. 155).
This position contains empirical and theoretical problems. As
Larry Alexander has commented, "[C]hildren are the Achilles heel of
liberalism."' 5 Empirically, we must ask the question: "How do chil-
dren learn?" What permutation of forced and free choices really
does prepare one for responsible dialogue? It is surely conceivable
that "classical education" ultimately develops a more critical capac-
ity than the less guided, "do-it-yourself' variety of education. That
is, perhaps for a man to arrive at any concept of truth, he must be
raised in the belief that he is experiencing truth, and at different
stages of his life be allowed to cast off that part of his belief that he
finds to be not truth, but shackles.'
6
Theoretically, the choice to nurture neutrality in the educa-
tional realm is itself a non-neutral choice. This observation is even
more acute if the neutrality choice leads to crude forms of material-
ism in education (who would ever enjoy Henry James the first time
they "tried it"?). Ackerman's treatment of education represents one
example of his tendency to confuse dialogue within a liberal state and
dialogue in favor of a liberal state.
Ackerman never fully explains what he intends by the conversa-
tional move "I am as good as you are." By not confronting this prob-
lem, he encounters a dilemma quite similar to one Professor Ronald
15 Alexander, supra note 1, at 855.
16 Se, e.g., PLATO, supra note 7 ("Allegory of the Cave").
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Dworkin encountered in articulating his theory of liberalism.' 7
Dworkin acknowledges that there are two plausible senses in which
one might say that a government treats its citizens with "equal con-
cern and respect." One is to suppose that a state must be neutral
regarding individual choices of the good. A second possibility, how-
ever, is to suppose that government cannot remain neutral on that
choice because it cannot treat persons with equal concern and respect
without a theory of the good. Treating a person as an equal, under
this alternative, means treating him in the way a truly good person
would want to be treated.
Dworkin ultimately says only that liberal equality endorses the
first possibility: a state must remain neutral regarding a theory of
good. But any concept of equality capable of justifying either one of
these radically opposed interpretations will need to be thoroughly
worked out if it is to play the fundamental role it does in Dworkin's
theory.' 8 Thus, one should only endorse the first interpretation if he
can present substantive arguments in its favor. Ackerman's concept
of neutrality is subject to the same criticism. Depending upon one's
conception of what it means to treat X in a way that guarantees that
X is being treated "as good as Y," one can envision quite different
theories of governmental behavior. To be totally neutral regarding
life plans, such a liberal government must respect even those life
plans that do not respect the fundamental "good as you" premise.
The liberal must defend today those who would wipe him from the
face of humanity tomorrow (e.g., a Jewish liberal defends the
Nazi's right to march in Skokie). It is unimaginable that a basic
value-neutrality--could provide an adequate foundation for defin-
ing the complex relationship between a liberal citizen and his
government.
The Concept of Autonomy
Another peculiar and persistent feature of Ackerman's theory is
his attempt to eschew any connection with Kantian philosophy,
while at the same time giving paramount importance to the notion of
individual autonomy and human dignity. 19 In deriding those liber-
als who endorse Kantian political philosophy, Ackerman confidently
17 Dworkin, supra note 9. For his very recent expansion of his theory of equality, see
Dworkin, What is Equality, Pts. I & II, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 185, 283 (1981).
18 See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 828 (1979), for an
extended discussion of this criticism.
19 See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1787). For an argument that there would
be a political upshot of the distinction, see R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLs 101 (1977).
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observes that such a move "makes liberalism a hostage of aparicular
metaphysical system" (p. 357). "Yet it is the essence of liberalism to
deny people the right to declare that their particular metaphysics
and epistemology contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth" (p. 357).
There are two flaws in Ackerman's position. First, a confusion
arises from his explicit contention that the role of political talk with
the liberal state and the role of political talk in defense of the liberal
state are perfectly parallel. "The task of philosophical conversation is
to make it possible for a person to reason his way to Neutrality with-
out declaring that the path he has chosen is intrinsically better than
any other route to liberalism" (p. 359). Ackerman here takes the lib-
eral spirit to the point of absurdity. Liberals must maintain that the
original structure of liberalism is substantively controversial and re-
quires philosophical justification. The task of liberal political philos-
ophy is to reach the political and moral truth-not to shove people
in as many diverse, and even bizarre, directions as possible. Philo-
sophical arguments in favor of the liberal state and political argu-
ments within the liberal state are not analogous.
Second, I have difficulty with Ackerman's belief that accepting
Kant's political philosophy entails accepting Kant's metaphysics
(and so what if it did-would there really be a political upshot of the
phenomenon/neomenon distinction?). Any liberal who takes seri-
ously the notion of personal autonomy, and the distinction between
the public and private realms, is bound (or doomed) to acknowledge
his debt to Kant, as opposed, e.g., to Plato. (Rawls makes an effort to
avoid Kant's metaphysics, but he does not attempt to avoid acknowl-
edging his debt to Kant, notwithstanding the metaphysics.) Why
should not the liberal endorse Kant as a starting point if philosophi-
cal reflection points in that direction? Why encourage people, just
for the liberally-spirited sake of it, to turn away from the well-devel-
oped, if controversial, existing framework?
Weale points out an important consequence of Ackerman's hesi-
tancy to acknowledge any legacy from Kant. Ackerman gives no real
argument for the intrinsically important nature of the autonomous
choosers whom the principle of neutrality protects. "In effect, this
position asks us to attach value simply to the idea of linguistically
competent purposive agency, without any consideration of the con-
tent of those purposes. '20 Yet, as Weale argues, such an assumption
raises the exact problems that Ackerman so critically points to in
20 Weale, supra note 1, at 696.
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Rawls' theory. Ackerman criticizes the notion of the ahistorical, aso-
cial, autonomous agent, surrounded by a veil of ignorance in the
original position. Yet only a similar leap of faith allows Ackerman:
(1) to ascribe such an important role to individual life plans (a prob-
lem of most liberals), and (2) to ascribe such importance to dia-
logic/linguistic competence-the ability to set forth one's theory of
the good (a problem uniquely Ackerman's).
Weale argues--correctly, I think-that one of the reasons neu-
trality seems so desirable in Ackerman's account is the nature of the
alternatives he presents (pp. 361-69)--e., they are either overly au-
thoritarian (e.g., the Philosopher-King) or incredibly obscure (e.g.,
Kant's metaphysics). To pose such a choice is to ignore all of the
philosophical and legal work justifying varying degrees of paternal-
ism, on the part of society and the state, between these two extremes.
The Concept of Exploitation
When Ackerman makes the transition from the ideal world to
"reality," he acknowledges that the statesman must "reckon with the
fact that every existing society is scarred by entrenched patterns of
domination which resist change, not because of some technological
constraint, but because those favored by the status quo will fight for
their advantages" (p. 240). Ackerman employs a notion of exploita-
tion through which he can acknowledge that groups exploit other
groups, and that members of the latter should receive compensation
as group members.
Ackerman has made a conceptual advance here, one that the
literature regarding affirmative action has not fully appreciated.
That is, the notion of neutral dialogue does help focus the issues of
injustice and prejudice at a more generic level. Often the question is
whether a particular person should be disadvantaged because of
harm suffered by another particular person (e.g., the white man who
protests affirmative action on the grounds that "he had never owned
a slave, stoned a school bus or oppressed a woman").2 1 Ackerman's
discussion recognizes that individuals will at any given time be part
of a number of groups and that perfect individual matches of
prejudice/harm/compensation will be hard to achieve. Prescrip-
tively, we should not feel we have to find such matches when histori-
cally we know that some groups will be discriminated against qua
groups.
21 N. Y. Times Magazine, June 15, 1975, at 53.
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Ackerman's advance is his sensitivity to the group exploitation
issue in the liberal framework of individual rights. He realizes that a
framework built on a theory of individualism is still capable of gener-
ating diverse forms of moral discourse. Although some would argue
that we cannot define possible areas of subjugation without identify-
ing certain individual rights, Ackerman shows that the liberal need
not accept this assertion. Individual rights are a certain type of
moral claim ("trumps" on collective justifications, in Dworkin's
words22); but they do not necessarily exhaust the liberal's "moral fur-
niture, '23 and one's reference point need not be solely individual nor
solely communal.
It has often been asserted that in some sense every statement
about law involves an overt or covert reference to some group. Eve-
ryone belongs to one or many communities and has a "complex so-
cial personality. ' 24 One's identity can be more or less strongly tied to
one or more social groups. Yet, while the notion of a "complex social
personality" reflects that we are, in the end, social beings, it does not
establish groups as ontologically primordial. Granted, in some his-
torical cases (e.g., redness in American history) one's identity may be
almost exclusively tied to a group. Still, even for a Native American,
it is inconceivable that every moral claim that an individual makes
will arise in terms of his membership in a group. The concept of
group and the concept of social being are closely related, but they are
not coextensive. Ackerman would allow that in certain contexts a
group reference point may be the only sensible and acceptable way
of addressing an issue.25 Yet Ackerman can still account for many
liberal values (privacy, self-expression) that would seem to have indi-
viduals as their primary reference point.
Again, although dialogue helps Ackerman focus these issues, the
validity of his points regarding the concept of group exploitation do
not depend on the existence of neutral dialogue. Any theory of indi-
vidual rights can accommodate the same points by simply defining
certain moral ground where claims of individual rights or harms
have no particular relevance.
26
22 R. DWORKIN, supra note 14.
23 J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1973).
24 L. Armour, Seeing Through the Looking Glass: Groups, Rights and Harm (unpub-
lished manuscript on file at the University of Montana Philosophy Department).
25 Se, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976).
26 Another advance in Ackerman's theory is his postulation of the pivotal role of eco-
nomic justice in liberal theory. In the ideal world, his basic moral card calls for each person
to receive an equal share of manna (p. 113). Like Dworkin, he rejects any principle of distri-
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Persons and Citizens in the Liberal State
Ackerman makes a number of interesting arguments when con-
sidering the concept of citizenship and personhood in the liberal
state. For example, his dialogues regarding genetic manipulation (p.
113) lead to the conclusion that a citizen can bring a child into the
world only if the child will obtain a quantity of manna "no less than
that guaranteed to members of the present generation." Further-
more, potential parents are restricted from bringing genetically dom-
inated beings into the world, ie., every member of the first
generation agreeing-that X-genotype is less capable of achieving his
favored conception of the good.
Ackerman insists that he has not forgotten the following objec-
tion to this procedure: the potential being might prefer simply to
exist, "rather than remain a mere conceptual possibility" (p. 116).
His response: "If a citizen agrees that B is at a relative disadvantage
in pursuing the good, he (the citizen) cannot pretend to be a privi-
leged communicant with the disembodied B and assert that B would
nonetheless prefer to be born" (p. 116).
Ackerman's insistence on the dialogic method in this area pro-
duces some oddly artificial results. For Ackerman, the only conceiva-
ble arguments on this point would be raised by a spiritual
communicant, because dialogue entails the need for one who can as-
bution that depends on interpersonal comparisons of welfare that would tell us how much
manna each individual would need to fulfill his wants equally. In this context neutrality, for
Ackerman, demands equal treatment, not just treatment as an equal. (As Dworkin says, we
cannot pretend that a person's preference for Moet Chandon is an infliction, an incurable
disease. It is morally irrelevant from the distributional point of view. Dworkin, supra note 9,
at 129.)
Yet this is one place where the transition from the ideal to reality must be scrutinized
closely. What ir the political payoff of Ackerman's theoretical distribution? Weale asks us to
consider that one important purported virtue of the equal distribution of manna is that it is
envy-free. However, once reality is "set in gear" people will begin trading goods in ways that
inevitably lead to non-envy-free allocations. "People may trade portions of their initial en-
dowments, and they may envy the commodity bundles of those who have benefited from the
general process of trading initial endowments." Weale, supra note 1, at 694. Thus, Weale
argues that the attraction of the "original equal manna" principle in reality is not as forceful
or as encompassing as in ideal theory. Different "commodity bundles" will lead, inevitably,
to cases of "unreciprocated envy."
Although Weale's point regarding envy is well taken, Ackerman would surely respond
that Weale simply misses the purpose of the original equal distribution principle. Ackerman's
goal is not to analyze the emotion of envy. His purpose is to establish the morally relevant
features for government to consider in the distribution of goods. He feels that many liberals
have not put their money where their mouths are and to do so one must have a norm of equal
distribution-a moral benchmark which makes such things as merit and ingenuity irrelevant.
(All of this is subject, of course, to the point made before-Ackerman never explicitly trans-
lates manna into real world terms).
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sert the complaint in its own name. Because ghosts do not exist, the
assertion cannot be made, and therefore the claims against genetic
planning are illegitimate.
Yet this is one point where the dialogic method might conflict
with one's intuitions regarding right and wrong (a plus from Acker-
man's viewpoint, of course). Surely one can universalize the situa-
tion, can put oneself in the other person's shoes, even if that person
does not exist. It may be as "realistically" possible for us to do this as
it is to put ourselves in the shoes of the Bangladeshi child (foreign,
disembodied, unknown). The object of morality may be to view the
world from other viewpoints, not necessarily John Doe's viewpoint.
It seems quite intelligible, and aliberal, rather than antiliberal, to
think that one would prefer to exist with less than not to exist at all.
Of course this is really only a part of Ackerman's general con-
cept of citizenship as depending on "dialogic competence" and "dia-
logic rights" (pp. 69-85). Ackerman is correct, I think, that
citizenship is best understood as a special construct, much like the
concept of "person," demanding some degree of intellectual or ra-
tional competence. To illustrate his point, Ackerman invents a ra-
tional talking ape. Ackerman notes that out of sympathy true
citizens may extend the "protective cloak of citizenship" to children
and idiots. In contrast, the rational ape may assert its citizenship for
itself: "The rights of the talking ape are more secure than those of
the human vegetable." It is the notion of a rational being here that is
doing the work;for that reason the apeness aspect becomes irrelevant.
Ackerman's theory depends upon one's ability to assert one's rights-
a literal forensic aspect. But a rights thesis is not doomed to such
artificial consequences. Rights may be ascribed to children, idiots, or
whatever we wish-the ascription of rights is a moral and political
enterprise, not a process of discovery. Rights are simply one form of
moral claim, an abbreviated type of argument, useful moral furni-
ture. It is not an inherent aspect of rights that the holder of the right
must be able to make the assertion of the right for himself, or itself.
Ackerman's citizenship thesis also overlooks much of the philo-
sophical literature regarding personal identity. It is not clear that the
liberal should accept Ackerman's claim that the idiot's rights are less
secure than the talking ape's. John Mackie, for example, has pointed
out that rationality and continuity of mind may not really be what is
at work when we call something a person. Rather, for us, homo sapiens
are the "objects of biologically determined and psychologically rein-
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forced concern. '27 This is not to say that a talking ape would not
present us with something "just as good"; but we would need further
conceptual reform to extend personal identity to cover this beast.
Even if our concern extends to children and idiots only out of
loyalty or courtesy to the species, it is not thereby less morally rele-
vant. Ackerman's emphasis on dialogue, and on the ability to assert
one's claims, leaves much of moral discourse curiously bankrupt.
Conclusion
Social Justice in the Liberal State is an engaging work; it merits
close scrutiny by legal philosophers and by lawyers. It is a fun book.
The dialogues constructed by Ackerman are amusing and witty. To
be sure, one of the attractions of legal scholarship should be that it
produces pleasure.28 Ackerman's book certainly accomplishes that
goal.
And yet, students of liberalism may have an uneasy feeling
when they finish the book. Liberalism is under attack from all sides.
A defense of liberalism must be as lucid as possible, unencumbered
by any excess conceptual baggage. I have argued that Ackerman's
method, "neutral dialogue," is generally superfluous to the many
moral arguments embedded in the book. To this extent, the use of
the dialogic device is sophistic and should not be endorsed as a defin-
ing component of liberal theory. The device should be discarded.
There are no acceptable unitary theories of liberalism-no sin-
gle "deep value" or generating theories that satisfactorily and consist-
ently account for all the values that liberals have historically
respected and protected. Ackerman's attempt to generate a unitary
theory of liberalism based on the concept of neutral dialogue is thus
misguided. It must fail because Ackerman does not acknowledge:
(1) that his task, as a liberal, is morally controversial, and (2) that a
theoretically consistent and tidy account of all forms of liberalism is
impossible. Indeed, it may well be that:
As things now stand, everything is up for grabs. Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad. Starving the poor is wicked. Buying and
selling each other is depraved. Those who stood up to and died
resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot-and General Custer
too-have earned salvation. Those who acquiesced deserve to be
damned. There is in the world such a thing as evil.
29
27 J. Mackie, Personal Identity, in PROBLEMS FROM JOHN LOCKE (1976).
28 See Leff, Aflerwork, 90 YALE L.J. 1296 (1981).
29 Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, DuKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979).
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Discrete islands of moral truth in a sea of political controversy-these
remain the ultimate landmarks against which any political philoso-
phy's success must be measured. All liberals must be sensitive to this
challenge.

